Abstract : Repeated zero-sum two-person games of incomplete information on one side are considered. If the one-shot game is played sequentially, the informed player moving first, it is proved that the value of the n-shot game is constant in n and is equal to the concavification of the game in which the informed player disregards his extra information. This is a strengthening of AUMANN and MASCnLER'S results for simultaneous games. Optimal strategies for both players are constructed explicitly.
Introduction
Consider two players, say player I and player II who are playing repeatedly the same zero-sum two-person game. The two players are in an asymmetric position due to the fact that one of them, say player I, knows the payoff matrix of the game while the other is uncertain about it. More precisely, he knows only the probability distribution according to which "chance" has chosen this matrix. Games of this type were studied by AUMANN and MASCHLER (AM). Their main result can be described as follows: Let v,(p) be the (minimax) value per play of the game with n plays, as a function of the apriori probability distribution p.
Then vn(p) converges to Cav u(p), the concavification of u(p), where u(p) is the value of the game in which player I disregards completely his extra information about the game. Cav u(p) is also the value of the game with infinitely many plays.
Intuitively the operation of concavification reflects in this context a behavior which is very typical to these games namely a partial revealing of information.
It turns out that the best thing for player I to do is generally to reveal only part of his information to player II. This portion of the information is to be released during the n plays of the game. Another question is therefore what is the optimal rate of releasing information. This optimal rate determines the speed of convergence vn(p) ~ Cav u(p) and it was studied by AM and by ZAMIR.
AM's result is for zero-sum two-person games in which the two players move simultaneously. This includes of course games in which the moves are made sequentially: Player I moves first, player 1I is informed of player I's move and then makes his own move. (Such a game can be looked at as a simultaneous game after redefining the pure strategies of player II.) a) j. p. PONSSARD, l~cole polyteehnique, Groupe de recherche en gestion des organisations 17, rue Descartes, Paris V e, France.
2) S. ZAMIR, University of California, Los Angeles, Department of Mathematics, 405 Hilgard Ave. Los Angeles, Cal. 90024, U.S.A.
For sequential games AM's result can be strengthened considerably namely: v,(p) = Cavu(p) for all n, and hence also v~(p) = Cavu(p). There is therefore no question about the speed of convergence. This result reflects the disadvantage of player I in the sequential game compared to the simultaneous game in which v,(p) >_ Cavu(p) . In sequential games, the player who is first to move has a clear disadvantage. These results were obtained by PONSSARD using convex analysis. In this paper we present a slightly different proof which has the advantage of leading to a simpler construction for the optimal strategies.
These optimal strategies are constructed for both players in the n-shot game, a task which is difficult in the general AM case where one could have only assymptotic optimal strategies. The optimal strategy for player I involves some lotteries the probability distribution of which depends on the actual game chosen by chance. The optimal strategy of player II is obtained by solving certain ordinary matrix games determined by the supporting hyperplane to the function Cavu(p). The calculation of the value and the optimal strategies are demonstrated by an example.
An interesting thing about the optimal strategies, which is worth some attention, is the fact that player I has usually to use a randomized strategy although for him the game is of perfect information. When he is called to make his move his information sets are all singletones. The incomplete information of player II, not about player I's move but about the chance move, makes the sequential game very much like the simultaneous game as far as the information structure is concerned. We may also interpret this fact in terms of bluffing; that is: Whenever player I is in a weak situation, with some probability he will play as if he were in a strong situation and vice versa. Actually, games with incomplete information have closed connections with poker games. The interested reader is referred to the original work of PONSSARD.
The Model
Let A 1 ... A r be m x n matrices viewed as payoff matrices of two-person zerosum games in which the two players are player I and player II and the sets of pure strategies are I = { 1 .... , m} and J = { 1 .... , n } respectively. Let K = { 1 .... , r} and denote by ai~, i sI, j e J, the elements of A k, k ~ K. Let P be the simplex: P={p=(pl...pr)[pk~OVk~K and Z=l}. keK For each p a P let Yl (p) be the two-person zero-sum game played as follows:
Step 0.
A chance move chooses an element k a K according to the probability vector p. Player I is informed which k was chosen but player II is not.
Step lr Player I (knowing k) chooses i a I. Player II is told which i was chosen.
Step ln. Player II (knowing i but not k) chooses j ~ J.
After step ln, player II pays player I ~j. The game/'1 (p) will be referred to as one-shot sequential game. Later we will discuss the n-shot game F,(p) in which the play consisting of steps 1j and 1 u is repeated n times and the payoff is made after each play according to the matrix A k chosen by chance at stage O. However we assume that the payoffs are not announced before the end of the n plays. We
"
also redefine the payoff to be the average payoff per stage p, = -h-~_ h,.,,,_ where h,. is the payoff for the m-th play. This is a mere normalization which enables us to compare the values of F,(p) for different values of n. Clearly F, (p) has a value according to the classical minimax theorem. Denote this value by v, (p).
The Main Theorem
The main result of the paper'is concerning the value vl (p) of the one-shot game FI(p). To state this result let us define for each p ~ P:
i ~ I, j ~ J, be the elements of A (p). One easily realizes that A (p) is the payoff matrix for a modified one-shot game, A t (P), in which none of the players is informed about the choice of chance k, (or equivalently, the informed player, player I, disregards his extra information). The value of d 1 (P) is readily found to be: u(p) = max rain aij(p ). In words the strategy x for player I is to play the mixed strategy (x],... ,x k) if the chance choice is k. The strategy y for player II is to play the mixed strategy 
Proof of Theorem 1 :
Since the only difference between the games F 1 (p) and A1 (p) is that the set of strategies for player I in A 1 (P) is a subset ofX (namely X ~ = { x e X ] x~ = x~' u i, k, k'}), one has the following relation between the values:
Hence by Lemma (2.1):
vl (p) >-u(p). v x (p) _> Cavu(p). (2.2)
To prove the opposite inequality, for any x s X and y ~ Y let:
It follows directly from (2.3) that p~ e P whenever 2~ # 0 and 
H(p,x,y) Z Z -i i k = E XiPkykaq = E E 2iy}aiJ(Pi) -i j k i j
Hence by the minimax theorem:
But by (2.4)~ xlu(P i) < Cavu(p). Hence v I (p) _< Cavu(p). i p p

Optimal Strategies
In this section we give explicit detailed description of optimal strategies for both players. As is often the case in such games the optimal strategies are essentially different for the two players. This is very much expected in view of the asymmetric roles of the two players.
The optimal strategy for player I is actually the strategy described by AUMANN and MASCHLER and by MERTENS-Z~Mm in a slightly different context. It is based on the following observations:
Letp, p~, .,. ,p' be r + 1 points in P such that p = ~ )~kp k, 2k > 0 ~ 2k = 1, then k k there are r lotteries with the same set of possible outcomes (O1 ... Or) with the following property: If k is chosen according to p and then the k-th lottery is performed then:
(a) The total probability of outcome 0,. is ,~, v = 1 .... , r.
(b) The conditional probability distribution on the chosen r given the outcome O visp~, v = 1,...,r.
The proof of this lemma which is straight forward is given in MERT~S-ZAMm (Lemma 2 p. 46).
Lemma 3.2 :
If player I announces his strategy a and then does a move i after hearing k, let p(a,i) be the conditional distribution on K given o-and i. Then the value of the game will not change if we modify the rules to let the payoffbe made according to a payoff matrix newly chosen according to p (a,i) .
This was proved in MERTENS-ZAMIR (Theorem 3.1, p. 45).
Now for any peP let vl(p)= Cavu(p)= ~ 2vu(p~), where preP, 2~> O,
... ,L r be the lotteries defined by lemma 3.1 for {2~,p~}. The strategy for player I can now be described as follows: After hearing k chosen by chance perform the lottery Lk if the outcome is O~, play optimally in the game A 1 (P~).
To see that this strategy is optimal we notice that the conditional probability distribution on K given the strategy and given O~ is pL By Lemma 3.2 we may assume that the payoff matrix is newly chosen according to pL Hence by playing optimally in A 1 (P~) player I guarantees u(pV). Since the total probability of O~ is 2~, player I guarantees at least ~ 2~u(p ~) = Cavu(p). 
Lemma 3.3 :
V i ~ I the value of Gi is _< 0.
Proof."
For any p ~ P, if player I plays i independently of k, his payoff in F I (p) will k But this is evidently not more than the value of F1 (p) which is be min ~ Pk %" 
The n-Shot Game
We turn now to the n-shot game F.(p) in which the game chosen by chance is played repeatedly n times by the same players. Recall that the payoff in F. (p) is defined as the average payoff per stage, hence we expect v.(p) to be of the same order of magnitude. However a much stronger statement can be made:
An optimal strategy for player I in F~ (p) described in the previous section with the understanding that the lottery Lk is made only once in the beginning and if the outcome is O, player I plays in all stages optimally in A ~ (p~). By exactly the same arguments that we had for/'1 (p) we get that this strategies guarantee However we see that for sequential repeated games (4.2) can be replaced by a much stronger statement, namely v,(p)= Cavu(p). We remark that if we define the infinite stage game F~(p) as it was defined in AM we have readily that the optimal strategies that we described for F,(p) are also optimal in F~ (p) and hence F~(p) = Cav ufp), a fact that also follows from AM results.
An Example
In our example r = m = n = 2,
Solution:
Let p' denote 1 -p for 0 <_ p <_ 1. In F,(p) the probability distribution according to which A k is chosen is (p,p'). Clearly, the scalar p(0 < p < 1) can replace the vector (p,p') as a variable of F,(p), AI(P), u(p) and v(p).
A 1 (P) corresponds to the matrix Hence:
u,p ax{min( p+p 10p) min } ,55
The function u(p) and its concavification v(p) are shown in Fig For player II we need the supporting hyperplane to v(p) which is 9p + p' = z. From this we construct G1 and G2 for finding optimal mixed strategies for player II: GI = = , optimal strategy for II is (1,0). 9 10 0
Similarly:G2=( 3 -9) (3 1) -1 3 '~ strategy for II is --g,--g .
By similar computations for 88 < p < ~ and ~ _< p < 1 we get finally the optimal strategies listed in the following tables: 
